# Post-Quantum Cryptography: Towards Commutative Supersingular Isogeny Key Exchange



Candidate Giovanni Tognolini Supervisor Prof. Nadir Murru

University of Trento

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  - Related theory
  - Changes
  - The protocol

# Pre Quantum Diffie-Hellman

Public parameters	A group $G = \langle P \rangle$ of order $N$ .	
	Alice	Bob
Pick random secret	$a \in G$	$b \in G$
Compute public data	A = [a]P	B = [b]P
Exchange data	$A \longrightarrow$	$\longleftarrow B$
Compute shared secret	S = [a]B	S = [b]A

 ${\bf Figure:\ Diffie-Hellman\ key-exchange\ protocol.}$ 

## The Quantum Threat



Solves integer factorization problem and discrete logarithms in polynomial time.

#### The Problem

Are we able to provide a drop-in post-quantum replacement for DH?

#### Section 2: Outline

- The Framework
  - Pre Quantum Diffie-Hellman
  - The Quantum Threat
  - The Problem
- 2 CRS
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# Definition (Schreier graph)

Let G be a group acting freely on a set <math>X through the map


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
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
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
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$$X = G = \mathbb{Z}_{13}^*$$
  
 $S = \{2, 2^{-1}\} \cup \{3, 3^{-1}\} \cup \{5, 5^{-1}\}$ 

# Where do we find a Schreier graph?

Isogeny graph

#### Definition (Isogeny)

An isogeny is a morphism  $\varphi: E \to E'$  such that  $\varphi(O_E) = O_{E'}$ 

#### Definition (Isogeny graph)

Let  $\mathbb{K}$  be a field. An *isogeny graph* is a directed graph such that:

- ullet Its vertices are  $\mathbb{K}$ -isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over  $\mathbb{K}$ .
- ullet Its edges are equivalence classes of isogenies defined over  $\mathbb K$  between such curves

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#### Observation

The structure of an isogeny graph strongly depends on the structure of  $\operatorname{End}(E)$ .

## Theorem (Deuring)

- ullet The integer ring  $\mathbb{Z}$ .
- An order  $\mathcal{O}$  in a quadratic imaginary field  $(\mathbb{Z}[\pi] \subseteq \mathcal{O} \subseteq \mathcal{O}_K \subseteq K := \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-d}))$ .
- A maximal order in a quaternion algebra.
- We consider curves of type 2.
- We consider isogeny of degree a prime l.
- We would like l such that  $\left(\frac{\Delta_K}{l}\right) = 1$ .

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Figure: A volcano of 3-isogenies and the corresponding tower of orders.




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





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## Definition (Ideal class group)

Let  $\mathcal{O}$  be an order in a number field K. The *ideal class group* of  $\mathcal{O}$  is the quotient

$$\mathrm{Cl}(\mathcal{O}) = \mathcal{I}(\mathcal{O})/\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{O}).$$

#### Definition (a-torsion)

Let  $\mathfrak{a}\subseteq\mathcal{O}$  be an integral invertible ideal of norm coprime to q. We define the  $\mathfrak{a}\text{-}torsion\ subgroup\ of\ }E$  as

$$E[\mathfrak{a}] = \{ P \in E \mid \alpha(P) = 0 \text{ for all } \alpha \in \mathfrak{a} \}.$$

The most unique property of (separable) isogenies is that they are entirely determined by their kernel.

Given an ideal  $\mathfrak{a} \subseteq \mathcal{O}$  as above, it is natural to define the isogeny  $\varphi_{\mathfrak{a}} : E \to E_{\mathfrak{a}}$ , where  $E_{\mathfrak{a}} = E/E[\mathfrak{a}]$ 

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#### Theorem

The class group  $Cl(\mathcal{O})$  acts freely and transitively on  $Ell_q(\mathcal{O})$  through the map

$$\operatorname{Cl}(\mathcal{O}) \times \operatorname{Ell}_q(\mathcal{O}) \to \operatorname{Ell}_q(\mathcal{O})$$
  
 $(\mathfrak{a}, E) \mapsto \mathfrak{a} \cdot E := E/E[\mathfrak{a}]$ 

We have found a set  $(\mathrm{Ell}_q(\mathcal{O}))$  and a group  $(\mathrm{Cl}(\mathcal{O}))$  acting on it regularly

#### Where is our symmetric subset S?

## Proposition

- *l* Elkies prime.
- $(l) = l \cdot \hat{l}$ , where  $l = (\pi \lambda, l)$  and  $\hat{l} = (\pi \mu, l)$  where

$$\pi^2 - t\pi + q = (\pi - \lambda)(\pi - \mu) \mod \ell$$




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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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




Figure: Graph of horizontal isogenies on 12 curves, with isogenies of three different degrees

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
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
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


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




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


Figure: Graph of horizontal isogenies on 12 curves, with isogenies of three different degrees

(University of Trento)

### CRS: The Protocol

Public parameters	An elliptic curve $E$ over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$ A set of Elkies primes $L = \{l_1, \dots, l_m\}$	
	A Frobenius eigenvalue $\lambda_i$ for each $l_i$	
	Alice	Bob
Pick random secret	$ \rho_A \in L^* $	$ \rho_B \in L^* $
Compute public data	$E_A = \rho_A(E)$	$E_B = \rho_B(E)$
Exchange data	$E_A \longrightarrow$	$\longleftarrow E_B$
Compute shared secret	$E_{AB} = \rho_A(E_B)$	$E_{AB} = \rho_B(E_A)$

 ${\bf Table:}\ {\bf Couveignes-Rostovtsev-Stolbunov}\ {\bf key}\ {\bf exchange}\ {\bf protocol.}$ 

# CRS: Security

### Definition (Key recovery problem)

Given two elliptic curves  $E_0$ , E defined over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  with the same rational endomorphism ring  $\mathcal{O}$ , find an ideal  $\mathfrak{a}$  of  $\mathcal{O}$  such that  $[\mathfrak{a}]E_0 = E$ .

#### CRS: Problems

#### Observation

- Breaking the CRS scheme amounts to solve an instance of the abelian hidden-shift problem, for which quantum algorithms with subexponential time complexity are known to exist.
- The protocol is unacceptably slow.

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### Index

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### CSIDH: Main Idea

Try to use supersingular curves and supersingular isogeny graphs.

For these curves the full endomorphism ring is isomorphic to and order in a quaternion algebra.

However, if we consider:

- Curves over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ .
- Isogenies over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ .

$$\operatorname{End}_{\mathbb{F}_p}(E) \cong \mathcal{O} \subseteq \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-d})$$

We can adapt the previous theory!

### **CSIDH:** Beneficts

# $Supersingular\ curves'\ beneficts$

- Structure of  $Cl(\mathcal{O})$ .
- Elkies primes.
- Efficient evaluation of the class group action.
- Public key & PKV.

# CSIDH: Class group structure

$$\#\operatorname{Cl}(\mathcal{O}) \approx \sqrt{|D_{\pi}|} = \sqrt{|t_{\pi}^2 - 4p|}$$

- The size of  $Cl(\mathcal{O})$  is as big as possible.
- ullet For a fixed security level we can do an almost minimal choice for p.

# CSIDH: Elkies primes

#### Previous problem

Inefficiency in the search for Elkies primes.

E supersingular elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ ,  $p = 4 \cdot l_1 \cdots l_n - 1$ 

$$#E(\mathbb{F}_p) \equiv p+1 \pmod{l_i}$$
  
$$\equiv 4 \cdot l_1 \cdots l_n - 1 + 1 \pmod{l_i}$$
  
$$\equiv 0 \pmod{l_i}$$

$$\pi^{2} - t\pi + p \equiv 0 \pmod{l_{i}}$$

$$\pi^{2} + p \equiv 0 \pmod{l_{i}}$$

$$\pi^{2} - 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{l_{i}}$$

$$(\pi + 1)(\pi - 1) \equiv 0 \pmod{l_{i}}$$

Every  $l_i$  is an Elkies prime and  $l_i = (\pi - 1, l), \hat{l_i} = (\pi + 1, l)$ 

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# CSIDH: Class group action

# How to compute $[\mathfrak{l}]E$ for $\mathfrak{l}=(l,\pi-\lambda)$

- Find a basis of the *l*-torsion.
- Compute the eigenspaces of the Frobenius.
- ullet Apply Vélu type formulas to a basis point P of the correct eigenspace.

# Observation $(\lambda = 1)$

In this case P (has order l and) lies in  $\ker(\pi - 1)$ , i.e. is defined over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ .

# Observation $(\lambda = -1)$

In this case P (has order l and) lies in  $\ker(\pi+1)$ , i.e. is defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ .

## CSIDH: Public key & PKV

Before we encoded an elliptic curve with its j-invariant.

#### And now?

## Proposition

#### Suppose

- $p \ge 5, p \equiv 3 \pmod{8}$ .
- $E/\mathbb{F}_p$  supersingular elliptic curve.

Then

$$\operatorname{End}_{\mathbb{F}_p}(E) \cong \mathbb{Z}[\pi] \Longleftrightarrow E \cong_{\mathbb{F}_p} E_A : y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$

for some  $A \in \mathbb{F}_p$ . Moreover, if such an A exists then it is unique.

## CSIDH: Public key & PKV

## Observation (Public key)

We can use the coefficient A as public key.

## Observation (Public key validation)

When we receive A all we have to do is to check that  $y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$  is supersingular.

### CSIDH: The Protocol

Public parameters	A prime $p$ of the form $4 \cdot l_1 \cdots l_n - 1$			
	$E := y^2 = x^3 + x \text{ over } \mathbb{F}_p$			
	Alice	Bob		
Pick random secret	$(e_1,,e_n) \in \{-m,,m\}^*$	( 1 / / 10 / )		
Compute public data	$E_A = [\mathfrak{a}]E = [\mathfrak{l}_1^{e_1}\mathfrak{l}_n^{e_n}]E$	$E_B = [\mathfrak{b}]E = [\mathfrak{l}_1^{e'_1}\mathfrak{l}_n^{e'_n}]E$		
Exchange data	$E_A \longrightarrow$	$\longleftarrow E_B$		
Compute shared secret	$E_{AB} = [\mathfrak{a}]E_B$	$E_{AB} = [\mathfrak{b}]E_A$		

Table: CSIDH key exchange protocol.

#### Conclusions

- Does not avoid subexponential attack (HSP).
- Drop-in post quantum replacement for Diffie Hellman.
- Speed is practical (80 ms for a single key-exchange).
- Smallest public key size in the portfolio of PQ-crypto.

Thanks

Extra

## Keys' dimension

#### Public key

 $A \in \mathbb{F}_p$  can be represented with  $\log p$  bits.

#### Private Key

We need to find how big is the quantity  $n \cdot \log m$ .

$$(2m+1)^n \approx \# \operatorname{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$$
$$\log (2m+1)^n \approx \log \# \operatorname{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$$
$$n \cdot \log (2m+1) \approx \log \sqrt{p}$$
$$n \cdot \log m \approx \log p/2$$

## CRS: Volcanology

Couveignes focuses on regular curves  $E/\mathbb{F}_q$ , with  $\operatorname{End}(E) \cong \mathcal{O} \subseteq \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-d})$ .

Given  $E/\mathbb{F}_q$ , how many isogenies defined over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  do have E as domain?

#### Proposition

Let  $E/\mathbb{F}_q$  an elliptic curve and  $l \neq p$  be a prime.

- There are l+1 distinct isogenies of degree with domain E defined over the algebraic closure  $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_q$ .
- **2** There are 0, 1, 2 or l+1 isogenies of degree l with domain E defined over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .

CRS: Volcanology

What is the relationship between two isogenous curves?

## Proposition (Horizontal and vertical isogenies)

Let  $\varphi: E \to E'$  be an isogeny of prime degree , and let  $\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{O}'$  be the orders corresponding to E, E'. Then, either  $\mathcal{O} \subseteq \mathcal{O}'$  or  $\mathcal{O}' \subseteq \mathcal{O}$ , and one of the following is true:


- $\mathcal{O} = \mathcal{O}'$ , in this case  $\varphi$  is said to horizontal.
- $[\mathcal{O}' : \mathcal{O}] = l$ , in this case  $\varphi$  is said to be ascending.
- $[\mathcal{O}:\mathcal{O}']=l$ , in this case  $\varphi$  is said to be descending.

## CRS: Volcanology

Global stucture: how many horizontal and vertical *l*-isogenies does a given curve have?

		$\rightarrow$	$\uparrow$	$\downarrow$
$\mathbb{Z}[\pi] = \mathcal{O}_K$	Surface = Middle = Floor	$1 + \left(\frac{\Delta_K}{l}\right)$		
$\mathbb{Z}[\pi] \subsetneq \mathcal{O}_K$	Surface	$1 + \left(\frac{\Delta_K}{l}\right)$		$l - \left(\frac{\Delta_K}{l}\right)$
	Middle		1	l
	Floor		1	

Table: Number and types of *l*-isogenies



Atkin: 
$$\left(\frac{\Delta_K}{l}\right) = -1$$



Ramified: 
$$\left(\frac{\Delta_K}{l}\right) = 0$$



Ramified: 
$$\left(\frac{\Delta_K}{l}\right) = 0$$
 Elkies:  $\left(\frac{\Delta_K}{l}\right) = +1$ 

# CSIDH: Classical security

Exhaustive key search

Meet-in-the-middle attack

Pohlig-Hellman style attack

## CSIDH: Quantum security

#### Observation (The query model)

Given a black-box function f, we have to answer a question about it. Instead of measuring the time complexity of our algorithm, we measure the query complexity: the number of queries it makes to f.

## Why do we use the query model?

- $\bullet$  Often the function f is efficient to implement.
- All known interesting quantum algorithm fit in the query paradigm.

## Quantum attacks based on the abelian hidden shift problem

### Definition (A-HSP)

Let A be a finite abelian group, T a finite set and let  $f_1, f_2 : A \to T$  be black-box functions. The functions  $f_1, f_2$  are said to hide a shift  $s \in A$  if  $f_1$  is injective and  $f_2(x) = f_1(xs)$  for all  $x \in A$ . The goal is then to recover s by evaluating the functions  $f_1$  and  $f_2$ .

$$f_1: \mathrm{Cl}(\mathcal{O}) \longrightarrow \mathrm{Ell}(\mathcal{O}) \qquad f_2: \mathrm{Cl}(\mathcal{O}) \longrightarrow \mathrm{Ell}(\mathcal{O})$$

$$\mathfrak{b} \longmapsto [\mathfrak{b}] E_0 \qquad \mathfrak{b} \longmapsto [\mathfrak{b}] E_A$$

These function hide the private key  $\mathfrak{a}$  as a shift:

$$f_1(x \cdot \mathfrak{a}) = [x \cdot \mathfrak{a}] E_A$$

$$= [x] [\mathfrak{a}] E_A$$

$$= [x] E_B$$

$$= f_2(x)$$

## Quantum attacks on the A-HSP

### Kuperberg

space and query complexity:  $2^{O(\sqrt{\log n})}$ 

## Regev

query complexity:  $2^{O(\sqrt{\log n \log \log n})}$  space complexity: polynomial

## Kuperberg

classical space and query complexity:  $2^{O(\sqrt{\log n})}$  quantum space:  $O(\log n)$ 

- These algorithms are shown to have subexponential complexity in the limit.
- $\bullet$  In a generic group the query complexity coincides with the time complexity,  $$\operatorname{BUT}$$

in our case the evaluation of  $f_1, f_2$  means evaluating the action  $[\mathfrak{a}] E_0, [\mathfrak{a}] E_A$ , which is non-trivial.



The time complexity must take into account this important factor.

• Regev:  $L_N[1/2, \sqrt{2}] = \exp\left[(\sqrt{2} + 1)\sqrt{\ln N \ln \ln N}\right]$  where  $N = \#\operatorname{Cl}(\mathcal{O})$ .

• Bisson:  $L_p[1/2, 1/\sqrt{2}] = \exp \left[ (1/\sqrt{2} + 1)\sqrt{\ln p \ln \ln p} \right]$ 

• Regev + Bisson:  $L_p[1/2, 3/\sqrt{2}] \Longrightarrow L_p[1/2, 1+\sqrt{2}].$ 

• Kuperberg + Bisson:  $L_p[1/2, 1/\sqrt{2}]$ .

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# CSIDH: Security Estimates

	Classical $\log \sqrt[4]{p}$	Regev $\log L_N[1/2,\sqrt{2}]$	Kuperberg $3\sqrt{\log N}$	Kuperberg 1.8 $\sqrt{\log N}$	Regev $\log L_p[1/2, 3/\sqrt{2}]$	Kuperberg $\log L_p[1/2,1/\sqrt{2}]$
CSIDH-512	128	62	48	29	139	47
CSIDH-1024	256	94	68	41	209	70
CSIDH-1792	448	129	90	54	288	96

#### **CSIDH**: Instantiations

	Clock cycles	Wall-clock time	Stack Memory
Key validation	$5.5 \cdot 10^6 \text{ cc}$	2.1 ms	4368 bytes
Group action	$106 \cdot 10^6 \text{ cc}$	40.8 ms	2464 bytes

Table: Performance number for the described proof-of-concept implementation, averaged over 10000 runs on an Intel Skylake i5 processor clocked at 3.5 GHz.